Univerisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328Legal Challenges of Artificial Intelligence Use in Healthcare: Iranian Law and European Union LawLegal Challenges of Artificial Intelligence Use in Healthcare: Iranian Law and European Union Law131300110.22091/csiw.2024.10071.2475FAHamedAgha Amini Fashami. PhD Student of Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran.0009-0004-5144-037xSeyyed HasanHosseini MoghadamAssociate Professor in Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran.0000-0001-8497-7174Journal Article20231109The rapid expansion of machine learning and other artificial intelligence technologies has demonstrated a significant potential to transform healthcare decision-making, diagnosis, and treatment. This study undertakes a comparative examination of the legal challenges arising from the deployment of artificial intelligence in the healthcare sector within the framework of Iranian law and European Union law. The central research question concerns the principal ethical and legal issues engendered by the use of AI in healthcare, and the adequacy of the existing legal responses in each jurisdiction. The study identifies and analyses challenges in two interrelated domains. In the ethical domain, the critical concerns addressed include the validity of informed consent where AI systems are integrated into clinical decision-making, the imperatives of safety and algorithmic transparency, and the risk of algorithmic bias productive of discriminatory outcomes. In the legal domain, the analysis encompasses the attribution of civil liability for harm occasioned by AI systems, the protection of patient privacy and personal health data, the safeguarding of intellectual property rights, and the ensuring of cybersecurity in interconnected medical devices and health information systems. The findings reveal a pronounced regulatory asymmetry: the European Union has undertaken extensive and sustained legislative efforts to construct a comprehensive legal architecture for the governance of AI in healthcare, most notably through the General Data Protection Regulation, the proposed Artificial Intelligence Act, and the evolving framework for civil liability, whereas Iranian law continues to lack a dedicated and integrated legislative framework governing artificial intelligence in this domain. Existing provisions concerning medical liability, data protection, public health, and privacy, scattered across disparate enactments, offer only fragmentary and inadequate guidance, and the study concludes that a thoroughgoing legislative revision is an urgent and unavoidable necessity.The rapid expansion of machine learning and other artificial intelligence technologies has demonstrated a significant potential to transform healthcare decision-making, diagnosis, and treatment. This study undertakes a comparative examination of the legal challenges arising from the deployment of artificial intelligence in the healthcare sector within the framework of Iranian law and European Union law. The central research question concerns the principal ethical and legal issues engendered by the use of AI in healthcare, and the adequacy of the existing legal responses in each jurisdiction. The study identifies and analyses challenges in two interrelated domains. In the ethical domain, the critical concerns addressed include the validity of informed consent where AI systems are integrated into clinical decision-making, the imperatives of safety and algorithmic transparency, and the risk of algorithmic bias productive of discriminatory outcomes. In the legal domain, the analysis encompasses the attribution of civil liability for harm occasioned by AI systems, the protection of patient privacy and personal health data, the safeguarding of intellectual property rights, and the ensuring of cybersecurity in interconnected medical devices and health information systems. The findings reveal a pronounced regulatory asymmetry: the European Union has undertaken extensive and sustained legislative efforts to construct a comprehensive legal architecture for the governance of AI in healthcare, most notably through the General Data Protection Regulation, the proposed Artificial Intelligence Act, and the evolving framework for civil liability, whereas Iranian law continues to lack a dedicated and integrated legislative framework governing artificial intelligence in this domain. Existing provisions concerning medical liability, data protection, public health, and privacy, scattered across disparate enactments, offer only fragmentary and inadequate guidance, and the study concludes that a thoroughgoing legislative revision is an urgent and unavoidable necessity.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_3001_c211bacf4b7a586008c166387b3408be.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328The Conditions and Legal Effects of Mergers of Commercial Companies in Iranian and European Union Law, with Particular Emphasis on Competition LawThe Conditions and Legal Effects of Mergers of Commercial Companies in Iranian and European Union Law, with Particular Emphasis on Competition Law3260403810.22091/csiw.2025.8583.2324FAMohammadhosseinTaghipour Darzi NaghibiAssistant Professor of Private Law, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran.0000-0003-4804-5681Seyedeh TahereMoosavi KhatirPhD in Private Law, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran/0000-0002-5041-1911MehdiTaleghan GhafariPhD Candidate of Private Law, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran.0000-0002-0085-9005Journal Article20230909liquidation proceedings, one commercial company is absorbed into another, or an entirely new company is formed through the combination of two or more existing companies. While corporate mergers have a long-standing legal tradition in jurisdictions such as England and the United States, they remain a relatively recent and underdeveloped legal institution in Iranian law, where they are addressed only in a fragmented and unsystematic manner across a disparate array of legislative instruments. This study adopts a descriptive-analytical methodology within a comparative framework to examine the legal architecture governing corporate mergers, the criteria and substantive standards for merger approval, the procedural and formal requirements, and the legal consequences of mergers under both Iranian law and European Union law, with particular emphasis on the role and requirements of competition law. The analysis encompasses the European Union's merger control regime, established under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and administered by the European Commission through the application of the Significantly Impeding Effective Competition Test, as well as the evolving Iranian framework, including the relevant provisions of the Law on Implementing the General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution and the successive drafts of the Commercial Code Bill. The findings indicate that, notwithstanding the significant structural and procedural differences between the two legal systems, both pursue the fundamental objective of preserving effective competition in the market and preventing anti-competitive concentrations. Nevertheless, the deficiencies and legislative gaps surrounding this legal institution in Iranian law remain pronounced, particularly with regard to the absence of a comprehensive statutory framework governing merger procedures, the protection of creditors and minority shareholders, and the institutional mechanisms for competition-based merger control. The study concludes that the enactment of a coherent and comprehensive legislative framework governing corporate mergers is an urgent and indispensable necessity to eliminate existing legal ambiguities, to align Iranian law with international standards, and to provide legal certainty in the context of the increasing internationalisation of commercial companies and the expansion of cross-border commercial transactions.liquidation proceedings, one commercial company is absorbed into another, or an entirely new company is formed through the combination of two or more existing companies. While corporate mergers have a long-standing legal tradition in jurisdictions such as England and the United States, they remain a relatively recent and underdeveloped legal institution in Iranian law, where they are addressed only in a fragmented and unsystematic manner across a disparate array of legislative instruments. This study adopts a descriptive-analytical methodology within a comparative framework to examine the legal architecture governing corporate mergers, the criteria and substantive standards for merger approval, the procedural and formal requirements, and the legal consequences of mergers under both Iranian law and European Union law, with particular emphasis on the role and requirements of competition law. The analysis encompasses the European Union's merger control regime, established under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and administered by the European Commission through the application of the Significantly Impeding Effective Competition Test, as well as the evolving Iranian framework, including the relevant provisions of the Law on Implementing the General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution and the successive drafts of the Commercial Code Bill. The findings indicate that, notwithstanding the significant structural and procedural differences between the two legal systems, both pursue the fundamental objective of preserving effective competition in the market and preventing anti-competitive concentrations. Nevertheless, the deficiencies and legislative gaps surrounding this legal institution in Iranian law remain pronounced, particularly with regard to the absence of a comprehensive statutory framework governing merger procedures, the protection of creditors and minority shareholders, and the institutional mechanisms for competition-based merger control. The study concludes that the enactment of a coherent and comprehensive legislative framework governing corporate mergers is an urgent and indispensable necessity to eliminate existing legal ambiguities, to align Iranian law with international standards, and to provide legal certainty in the context of the increasing internationalisation of commercial companies and the expansion of cross-border commercial transactions.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_4038_9f86db229a9e29836ada82e37a2bd84f.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328Constitutional Review in the Pursuit of Just Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Iranian Guardian Council and the German Federal Constitutional CourtConstitutional Review in the Pursuit of Just Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Iranian Guardian Council and the German Federal Constitutional Court6193300010.22091/csiw.2024.10590.2524FAMohammadshahabJalilvandAssistant Professor of Public Law, Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, Tehran, Iran.0000-0003-0362-3900Journal Article20240406Legislation plays an indispensable role in the realisation of the ideal of justice, and constitutional adjudicatory bodies perform a vital function in safeguarding the fundamental values and principles enshrined in the constitution through the exercise of constitutional review. In assessing the conformity of ordinary legislation with the constitution, Iran's Guardian Council and the German Federal Constitutional Court have, on occasion, adopted interpretive approaches extending beyond the explicit provisions of their respective constitutional texts, treating the justness of legislation as an essential qualitative attribute of law and thereby seeking to advance the constitutional commitment to justice. This article, employing a descriptive-analytical methodology within a comparative framework, addresses the following central question: what are the legal foundations, criteria, and modalities through which these two institutions exercise oversight of the justness of legislation, and in what significant respects do their approaches diverge? The study finds that both the Guardian Council and the Federal Constitutional Court have pursued the realisation of just legislation not only through the formal review of constitutionality but also through substantive scrutiny of the qualitative attributes of law. Such qualitative oversight derives not merely from specific constitutional provisions but, even where it entails an expansive interpretation of the adjudicator's mandate, from the overarching spirit of the constitution in its commitment to the realisation of justice. The comparative analysis further demonstrates that, within the limited scope of its engagement with the justness of legislation, the Guardian Council has confined itself almost exclusively to considerations of economic justice, with particular emphasis on distributive and allocative justice, whereas the Federal Constitutional Court has adopted a considerably broader and more systematic conception, encompassing the social, economic, political, cultural, and religious dimensions of justice, and has operationalised the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination as reference norms in its qualitative review of ordinary legislation.Legislation plays an indispensable role in the realisation of the ideal of justice, and constitutional adjudicatory bodies perform a vital function in safeguarding the fundamental values and principles enshrined in the constitution through the exercise of constitutional review. In assessing the conformity of ordinary legislation with the constitution, Iran's Guardian Council and the German Federal Constitutional Court have, on occasion, adopted interpretive approaches extending beyond the explicit provisions of their respective constitutional texts, treating the justness of legislation as an essential qualitative attribute of law and thereby seeking to advance the constitutional commitment to justice. This article, employing a descriptive-analytical methodology within a comparative framework, addresses the following central question: what are the legal foundations, criteria, and modalities through which these two institutions exercise oversight of the justness of legislation, and in what significant respects do their approaches diverge? The study finds that both the Guardian Council and the Federal Constitutional Court have pursued the realisation of just legislation not only through the formal review of constitutionality but also through substantive scrutiny of the qualitative attributes of law. Such qualitative oversight derives not merely from specific constitutional provisions but, even where it entails an expansive interpretation of the adjudicator's mandate, from the overarching spirit of the constitution in its commitment to the realisation of justice. The comparative analysis further demonstrates that, within the limited scope of its engagement with the justness of legislation, the Guardian Council has confined itself almost exclusively to considerations of economic justice, with particular emphasis on distributive and allocative justice, whereas the Federal Constitutional Court has adopted a considerably broader and more systematic conception, encompassing the social, economic, political, cultural, and religious dimensions of justice, and has operationalised the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination as reference norms in its qualitative review of ordinary legislation.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_3000_6f3bc72eb3a84fb547704442e5c091d3.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328The Wife's Duty to Observe Hijab and Ifaf from the Perspective of the Imperatives of Family Law: A Comparative Study of the Iranian and English Legal SystemsThe Wife's Duty to Observe Hijab and Ifaf from the Perspective of the Imperatives of Family Law: A Comparative Study of the Iranian and English Legal Systems94122403210.22091/csiw.2025.11828.2614FASeyyedeh OmolbaninHoseiniAssistant Professor of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.Journal Article20241204The ruling concerning the obligatory nature of hijab (<em>Islamic outfit</em>) remains a matter of settled consensus among both Shia and Sunni jurists and constitutes one of the firmly established principles of Islamic jurisprudence (<em>fiqh</em>), notwithstanding the insinuations and skepticism that have surfaced in contemporary public discourse. However, a dimension that has received considerably less scholarly examination is the wife's duty to observe the conventional limits of <em>hijab</em> and <em>ifaf</em> (outward decorum in dress and conduct & inward chastity and restraint) in a manner commensurate with the exigencies of spousal and familial relations. This article addresses the question of whether, as one aspect of the husband's rights over the wife, a duty exists on the part of the wife to observe the conventional standards of <em>hijab</em> and <em>ifaf</em> according to the criterion of customary reasonableness, and, if so, what legal means of enforcement the husband possesses to secure compliance. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology and drawing upon established jurisprudential foundations and authoritative legal sources, the study reconceptualizes this obligation by expanding it from a purely individual religious duty to a familial obligation grounded in the reciprocal rights and duties of the spouses. Placing particular emphasis on the Jurisprudential Rule of Reasonable Conduct in Marital Relations (<em>qāʿidat luzūm al-muʿāsharah bi-l-maʿrūf</em>), the statutory duty of spouses to render mutual assistance in the consolidation of the family's foundations under Article 1104 of the Iranian Civil Code, and the reciprocal duty of fidelity and the preservation of the sanctity of the marital bond, the article concludes that the observance of modest <em>ifaf</em> and appropriate standards of <em>hijab</em> cannot be regarded as solely the wife's personal and private concern. On the contrary, such observance constitutes, in certain circumstances, an integral element of the husband's marital rights and, in other circumstances, an essential component of the wife's obligations within the familial unit. The husband possesses certain legal means of enforcement to secure the wife's compliance, but these are circumscribed by the overarching normative framework of the Rule of Reasonable Conduct and remain at all times confined within the imperatives of ethics and the preservation of the woman's dignity. The article further undertakes a comparative examination of the relevant legal concepts in the English legal system, finding that, although English law contains no statute that directly prescribes <em>hijab</em> or <em>ifaf</em> as a legal duty, the presence of related concepts, most notably fidelity and adultery, and their cognates in the law of divorce and matrimonial finance, indicates that the English legal system is not wholly unacquainted with the legal consequences that may flow from a failure to observe the requirements of modesty (<em>ifaf</em>) in marital relations.The ruling concerning the obligatory nature of hijab (<em>Islamic outfit</em>) remains a matter of settled consensus among both Shia and Sunni jurists and constitutes one of the firmly established principles of Islamic jurisprudence (<em>fiqh</em>), notwithstanding the insinuations and skepticism that have surfaced in contemporary public discourse. However, a dimension that has received considerably less scholarly examination is the wife's duty to observe the conventional limits of <em>hijab</em> and <em>ifaf</em> (outward decorum in dress and conduct & inward chastity and restraint) in a manner commensurate with the exigencies of spousal and familial relations. This article addresses the question of whether, as one aspect of the husband's rights over the wife, a duty exists on the part of the wife to observe the conventional standards of <em>hijab</em> and <em>ifaf</em> according to the criterion of customary reasonableness, and, if so, what legal means of enforcement the husband possesses to secure compliance. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology and drawing upon established jurisprudential foundations and authoritative legal sources, the study reconceptualizes this obligation by expanding it from a purely individual religious duty to a familial obligation grounded in the reciprocal rights and duties of the spouses. Placing particular emphasis on the Jurisprudential Rule of Reasonable Conduct in Marital Relations (<em>qāʿidat luzūm al-muʿāsharah bi-l-maʿrūf</em>), the statutory duty of spouses to render mutual assistance in the consolidation of the family's foundations under Article 1104 of the Iranian Civil Code, and the reciprocal duty of fidelity and the preservation of the sanctity of the marital bond, the article concludes that the observance of modest <em>ifaf</em> and appropriate standards of <em>hijab</em> cannot be regarded as solely the wife's personal and private concern. On the contrary, such observance constitutes, in certain circumstances, an integral element of the husband's marital rights and, in other circumstances, an essential component of the wife's obligations within the familial unit. The husband possesses certain legal means of enforcement to secure the wife's compliance, but these are circumscribed by the overarching normative framework of the Rule of Reasonable Conduct and remain at all times confined within the imperatives of ethics and the preservation of the woman's dignity. The article further undertakes a comparative examination of the relevant legal concepts in the English legal system, finding that, although English law contains no statute that directly prescribes <em>hijab</em> or <em>ifaf</em> as a legal duty, the presence of related concepts, most notably fidelity and adultery, and their cognates in the law of divorce and matrimonial finance, indicates that the English legal system is not wholly unacquainted with the legal consequences that may flow from a failure to observe the requirements of modesty (<em>ifaf</em>) in marital relations.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_4032_3fc98bb10d4832af01382e238e914324.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328The Principle of Timeliness in Civil Procedure and the Sanction for Its Violation: Insights from Imāmī Jurisprudence and the European Convention on Human RightsThe Principle of Timeliness in Civil Procedure and the Sanction for Its Violation: Insights from Imāmī Jurisprudence and the European Convention on Human Rights123148403110.22091/csiw.2025.11132.2576FAHoseinDavoudi BeiraqAssociate Professor of Private Law, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.0000-0002-2600-3176SaharKarimiAssociate Professor of Private Law, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.0000-0002-7335-1878MaryamHeydariPhD Candidate of Private Law, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.0009-0009-9270-0920Journal Article20240811The observance of timeliness in civil proceedings is a crucial element of the right to a fair trial, serving simultaneously the interests of the individual litigant and the broader community. The expeditious conduct of proceedings is recognized as a fundamental human right of such significance that it has been expressly enshrined in numerous national legal systems and international instruments, most notably the European Convention on Human Rights, which enumerates adjudication within a reasonable time among the essential guarantees of a fair hearing. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates that the failure to observe the requirement of a reasonable time engages the international responsibility of the respondent state and gives rise to an obligation to afford just satisfaction, including compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. In contrast, the Iranian Civil Procedure Code contains no express provision requiring adjudication within a reasonable time, nor does it establish any effective legal sanction for the violation of this requirement, although the concept of timeliness demonstrably underlies a significant number of its provisions. This article undertakes a doctrinal examination of the nature and legal status of timeliness in civil proceedings, drawing upon the normative resources of Imāmī jurisprudence and the comparative model furnished by the European Convention on Human Rights. The study concludes that timeliness cannot properly be characterized as an autonomous legal principle, but rather constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of civil procedure, subordinate to the overriding imperative of qualitative justice. It further argues that the express legislative recognition of the right to adjudication within a reasonable time, coupled with the establishment of an effective mechanism for the compensation of loss occasioned by undue delay, drawing upon the model of the European Convention and the rich tradition of Imāmī jurisprudence, would represent a significant advance in the protection of the procedural rights of litigants within the Iranian legal system.The observance of timeliness in civil proceedings is a crucial element of the right to a fair trial, serving simultaneously the interests of the individual litigant and the broader community. The expeditious conduct of proceedings is recognized as a fundamental human right of such significance that it has been expressly enshrined in numerous national legal systems and international instruments, most notably the European Convention on Human Rights, which enumerates adjudication within a reasonable time among the essential guarantees of a fair hearing. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates that the failure to observe the requirement of a reasonable time engages the international responsibility of the respondent state and gives rise to an obligation to afford just satisfaction, including compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. In contrast, the Iranian Civil Procedure Code contains no express provision requiring adjudication within a reasonable time, nor does it establish any effective legal sanction for the violation of this requirement, although the concept of timeliness demonstrably underlies a significant number of its provisions. This article undertakes a doctrinal examination of the nature and legal status of timeliness in civil proceedings, drawing upon the normative resources of Imāmī jurisprudence and the comparative model furnished by the European Convention on Human Rights. The study concludes that timeliness cannot properly be characterized as an autonomous legal principle, but rather constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of civil procedure, subordinate to the overriding imperative of qualitative justice. It further argues that the express legislative recognition of the right to adjudication within a reasonable time, coupled with the establishment of an effective mechanism for the compensation of loss occasioned by undue delay, drawing upon the model of the European Convention and the rich tradition of Imāmī jurisprudence, would represent a significant advance in the protection of the procedural rights of litigants within the Iranian legal system.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_4031_e930b5e079dbb5a705f8c226addab1e1.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328The Weaponization of Water in International Law: A Case Study of the Gaza Crisis (2023-2024)The Weaponization of Water in International Law: A Case Study of the Gaza Crisis (2023-2024)149173362310.22091/csiw.2025.12051.2620FAMahnazRashidiAssistant Professor of Public International Law, Faculty of Human Science, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran.0000-0003-4675-5460ZahraMaleki RadPhD Student of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.0000-0001-6988-3380Journal Article20250104The inherent scarcity of freshwater resources worldwide and the vital importance of access to water for human life, survival, and societal stability render water a potential instrument for the attainment of political and military objectives, a phenomenon designated in the literature as the weaponization of water. This practice, which may assume strategic, tactical, or coercive forms, is particularly prevalent during armed conflicts, where parties seek to exploit the adversary's dependence on water to secure military advantage or to coerce civilian populations. The ongoing conflict in Gaza, which commenced in October 2023, presents a stark and well-documented instance of this phenomenon, with Israel having employed water as a weapon and an instrument of warfare in pursuit of its political and military objectives. This article addresses the central question of the legal status of the weaponization of water in the Gaza Strip under public international law. Adopting a descriptive-analytical methodology and drawing upon a comprehensive review of treaty provisions, customary international law, and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, the study concludes that the weaponization of water during armed conflicts is fundamentally inconsistent with the obligations of States under the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law, including the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, the principle of humane treatment, and the prohibition of the infliction of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury upon civilians. The deliberate deprivation of the civilian population of access to water, whether through the destruction of water infrastructure, the obstruction of humanitarian relief, or the contamination of water sources, further contravenes the specific prohibition, enshrined in Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, of attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, as well as the customary prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The study further finds that the acts committed by Israel in relation to the weaponization of water during the Gaza conflict may constitute conduct forming the material elements of international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, as reflected in the statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court seeking warrants of arrest against senior Israeli officials. The article concludes that the existing normative framework governing the protection of water resources during armed conflicts remains fragmentary and insufficient, and that the progressive development of international law in this field, including the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on the protection of the environment in armed conflicts, constitutes an urgent imperative.The inherent scarcity of freshwater resources worldwide and the vital importance of access to water for human life, survival, and societal stability render water a potential instrument for the attainment of political and military objectives, a phenomenon designated in the literature as the weaponization of water. This practice, which may assume strategic, tactical, or coercive forms, is particularly prevalent during armed conflicts, where parties seek to exploit the adversary's dependence on water to secure military advantage or to coerce civilian populations. The ongoing conflict in Gaza, which commenced in October 2023, presents a stark and well-documented instance of this phenomenon, with Israel having employed water as a weapon and an instrument of warfare in pursuit of its political and military objectives. This article addresses the central question of the legal status of the weaponization of water in the Gaza Strip under public international law. Adopting a descriptive-analytical methodology and drawing upon a comprehensive review of treaty provisions, customary international law, and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, the study concludes that the weaponization of water during armed conflicts is fundamentally inconsistent with the obligations of States under the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law, including the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, the principle of humane treatment, and the prohibition of the infliction of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury upon civilians. The deliberate deprivation of the civilian population of access to water, whether through the destruction of water infrastructure, the obstruction of humanitarian relief, or the contamination of water sources, further contravenes the specific prohibition, enshrined in Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, of attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, as well as the customary prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The study further finds that the acts committed by Israel in relation to the weaponization of water during the Gaza conflict may constitute conduct forming the material elements of international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, as reflected in the statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court seeking warrants of arrest against senior Israeli officials. The article concludes that the existing normative framework governing the protection of water resources during armed conflicts remains fragmentary and insufficient, and that the progressive development of international law in this field, including the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on the protection of the environment in armed conflicts, constitutes an urgent imperative.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_3623_c95d216e6d3aec780cb2911e705b62ef.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328The Concept and Categories of Damage in Iranian Law, Islamic Jurisprudence, and Common LawThe Concept and Categories of Damage in Iranian Law, Islamic Jurisprudence, and Common Law174212395910.22091/csiw.2025.13810.2719FAHedayatollahSoltani-NejadAssistant Professor, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.Journal Article20250905The proof of legally cognisable damage remains a foundational pillar for the establishment of both tortious and contractual liability. A claimant seeking reparation must adduce credible evidence to substantiate three essential elements: the occurrence and nature of the damage suffered, the wrongful act or omission or breach of contractual obligation giving rise to the claim, and the causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and the loss sustained. Nevertheless, persistent ambiguity surrounding the concept, scope, and classification of damage, particularly within the Iranian legal system, has, in practice, generated significant challenges in the proof of this essential element, thereby undermining the effective protection of injured parties' rights. Adopting a comparative approach, this article examines the concept and categories of damage in three legal systems, Iranian law, Imāmī jurisprudence, and the common law, employing a descriptive-analytical methodology to identify the principal points of convergence and divergence and to advance recommendations for the refinement of the legal framework governing damages in Iranian law. The study finds that, in none of the three systems, has a formal statutory definition of damage been enacted, each having largely confined itself to the enumeration of particular instances. The scholarly definitions that have been proposed converge upon the recognition that damage is a broad, multi-dimensional, and inherently flexible concept, capable of encompassing both material losses, such as the destruction of property or the loss of an accrued benefit, and non-pecuniary losses, such as injury to reputation, dignity, feelings, or the deprivation of legitimate opportunities. In Iranian law, the concept has predominantly been confined to tangible and present financial losses, and the categories thereof are set out in an unsystematic fashion across a disparate array of statutes, resulting in persistent uncertainty regarding the compensability of non-pecuniary harm, future losses, and losses arising from the loss of an opportunity. In Imāmī jurisprudence, although foundational principles such as the rule prohibiting the infliction of harm, causation, and direct destruction form the doctrinal substratum for compensation, theoretical fragmentation has precluded the extraction of a uniform concept. In the common law, by contrast, the concept has been elaborated in a considerably more comprehensive and systematic manner, with express recognition of a wide spectrum of damage types and a sophisticated classification of compensatory remedies. The study concludes that the Iranian legislature should enact a comprehensive statutory definition of damage, accompanied by a clear enumeration of its principal categories, in order to harmonise jurisprudential theory with the statutory framework, to enhance the coherence of judicial practice, and to ensure more effective protection for injured parties in both civil and contractual claims.The proof of legally cognisable damage remains a foundational pillar for the establishment of both tortious and contractual liability. A claimant seeking reparation must adduce credible evidence to substantiate three essential elements: the occurrence and nature of the damage suffered, the wrongful act or omission or breach of contractual obligation giving rise to the claim, and the causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and the loss sustained. Nevertheless, persistent ambiguity surrounding the concept, scope, and classification of damage, particularly within the Iranian legal system, has, in practice, generated significant challenges in the proof of this essential element, thereby undermining the effective protection of injured parties' rights. Adopting a comparative approach, this article examines the concept and categories of damage in three legal systems, Iranian law, Imāmī jurisprudence, and the common law, employing a descriptive-analytical methodology to identify the principal points of convergence and divergence and to advance recommendations for the refinement of the legal framework governing damages in Iranian law. The study finds that, in none of the three systems, has a formal statutory definition of damage been enacted, each having largely confined itself to the enumeration of particular instances. The scholarly definitions that have been proposed converge upon the recognition that damage is a broad, multi-dimensional, and inherently flexible concept, capable of encompassing both material losses, such as the destruction of property or the loss of an accrued benefit, and non-pecuniary losses, such as injury to reputation, dignity, feelings, or the deprivation of legitimate opportunities. In Iranian law, the concept has predominantly been confined to tangible and present financial losses, and the categories thereof are set out in an unsystematic fashion across a disparate array of statutes, resulting in persistent uncertainty regarding the compensability of non-pecuniary harm, future losses, and losses arising from the loss of an opportunity. In Imāmī jurisprudence, although foundational principles such as the rule prohibiting the infliction of harm, causation, and direct destruction form the doctrinal substratum for compensation, theoretical fragmentation has precluded the extraction of a uniform concept. In the common law, by contrast, the concept has been elaborated in a considerably more comprehensive and systematic manner, with express recognition of a wide spectrum of damage types and a sophisticated classification of compensatory remedies. The study concludes that the Iranian legislature should enact a comprehensive statutory definition of damage, accompanied by a clear enumeration of its principal categories, in order to harmonise jurisprudential theory with the statutory framework, to enhance the coherence of judicial practice, and to ensure more effective protection for injured parties in both civil and contractual claims.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_3959_4522b33bcaeaed560525a398d0dba226.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328The Transition from Absolute to Restrictive State Immunity: A Comparative Study of Scandinavia and the Middle East through the Lens of International Law DevelopmentsThe Transition from Absolute to Restrictive State Immunity: A Comparative Study of Scandinavia and the Middle East through the Lens of International Law Developments213250360410.22091/csiw.2025.12333.2634FAMahdiFiroozabadianAssistant Professor, Department of Law, Torbat-e Heidarieh Branch, Islamic Azad University, Iran.0000-0001-9443-7366ZohreAfshar QuchaniAssistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Bojnourd, Bojnourd, Iran.0009-0000-5349-7469FaramarzYadegarianMaster’s Student, Department of International Law, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.0000-0002-4561-4669Journal Article20250209Recent developments in public international law have precipitated a fundamental redefinition of the doctrine of state immunity and a decisive shift from the traditional paradigm of absolute immunity towards the modern doctrine of restrictive immunity. This study undertakes a comparative analysis of this transition in four Scandinavian countries - Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland - and three Middle Eastern countries - Iran, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. The particular significance of this inquiry resides in the remarkable diversity of the legal systems under examination: the Scandinavian countries operate within civil law traditions possessing the distinctive characteristics of Nordic legal culture; Iran possesses a mixed legal system incorporating elements of both Islamic law and the civil law tradition; Türkiye has adopted the European civil law model; and the United Arab Emirates features a dual legal system, influenced by Sharia law, which applies civil law alongside common law in its financial free zones. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology and drawing upon an extensive review of international legal instruments, domestic legislation, and the published case law of the national courts concerned, the study identifies and analyses the principal factors driving this transition, including the expansion of international commercial relations, the normative influence of international conventions, most notably the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property of 2004, the pressures of globalization, and domestic legislative and judicial reforms. The findings demonstrate that, notwithstanding the considerable structural, cultural, and political differences among the countries examined, all are progressing towards the adoption of restrictive immunity, albeit at differing rates and through distinct institutional mechanisms: the Scandinavian countries have advanced more rapidly through dynamic judicial practice and progressive statutory reform, whereas the Middle Eastern countries have proceeded more gradually, primarily through discrete legislative developments. The study concludes with an array of recommendations for the Iranian legal system, including the enactment of comprehensive legislation on state immunity that clearly delineates sovereign from commercial acts, the development of consistent judicial practice, and active participation in international fora addressing issues of state immunity, in order to align domestic law more closely with contemporary developments in public international law.Recent developments in public international law have precipitated a fundamental redefinition of the doctrine of state immunity and a decisive shift from the traditional paradigm of absolute immunity towards the modern doctrine of restrictive immunity. This study undertakes a comparative analysis of this transition in four Scandinavian countries - Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland - and three Middle Eastern countries - Iran, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. The particular significance of this inquiry resides in the remarkable diversity of the legal systems under examination: the Scandinavian countries operate within civil law traditions possessing the distinctive characteristics of Nordic legal culture; Iran possesses a mixed legal system incorporating elements of both Islamic law and the civil law tradition; Türkiye has adopted the European civil law model; and the United Arab Emirates features a dual legal system, influenced by Sharia law, which applies civil law alongside common law in its financial free zones. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology and drawing upon an extensive review of international legal instruments, domestic legislation, and the published case law of the national courts concerned, the study identifies and analyses the principal factors driving this transition, including the expansion of international commercial relations, the normative influence of international conventions, most notably the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property of 2004, the pressures of globalization, and domestic legislative and judicial reforms. The findings demonstrate that, notwithstanding the considerable structural, cultural, and political differences among the countries examined, all are progressing towards the adoption of restrictive immunity, albeit at differing rates and through distinct institutional mechanisms: the Scandinavian countries have advanced more rapidly through dynamic judicial practice and progressive statutory reform, whereas the Middle Eastern countries have proceeded more gradually, primarily through discrete legislative developments. The study concludes with an array of recommendations for the Iranian legal system, including the enactment of comprehensive legislation on state immunity that clearly delineates sovereign from commercial acts, the development of consistent judicial practice, and active participation in international fora addressing issues of state immunity, in order to align domestic law more closely with contemporary developments in public international law.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_3604_2adfa8247e4528a820695b97dd8a90d7.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Indirect Perpetration in the Iranian Legal System and the ICC JurisprudenceA Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Indirect Perpetration in the Iranian Legal System and the ICC Jurisprudence251290390210.22091/csiw.2025.12984.2665FASaeedGhaediPhD Student in Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Judicial Sciences, Tehran. Iran.0009-0000-5622-6998BehzadRazavifardAssociate Professor, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Allamah Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran.0009-0000-5622-6998MortezaRastehMSc in Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Chalous Branch, Islamic Azad University, Mazandaran, Iran.0000-0002-8710-1677Journal Article20250519The doctrine of indirect perpetration, designated in Iranian legal doctrine as the <em>fā‘il-i ma‘navī</em> and in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court as the <em>indirect perpetrator</em> or the <em>mastermind of a crime</em>, remains one of the most significant yet theoretically contested forms of individual criminal responsibility. This article undertakes a comparative analysis of this criminal law institution within the Iranian legal system and the regime established under the Rome Statute of the ICC, employing a descriptive-analytical methodology to identify and examine the principal points of convergence and divergence between the two systems. The findings indicate that, on the one hand, the commission of a crime through the instrumentality of another, whether by means of innocent or guilty agency, the requirement of legal and practical authority over the physical perpetrator, conceptualized in the jurisprudence of the Court through the criterion of effective control over the crime, the necessity of a causal nexus between the conduct of the indirect perpetrator and the criminal result, and the requirement of the mental elements of intent and knowledge, constitute significant manifestations of the common aspects of the doctrine in the two legal orders. On the other hand, the acceptance of indirect perpetration as a general doctrine under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, in contrast to its fragmented and non-generalized recognition in Iranian criminal law; the requirement of a positive act by the indirect perpetrator under Iranian law, as opposed to the possibility of committing international crimes by omission within the jurisdiction of the Court; the adoption of a subjectivist approach and the imposition of equal punishment upon the indirect perpetrator and the physical perpetrator in the jurisprudence of the Court, in contrast to the mixed approaches to the criminal liability of the indirect perpetrator in the Iranian system, which alternate between subjectivist and objectivist orientations depending on the statutory context; and, finally, the unfeasibility of punishing the indirect perpetrator in Iranian law in the absence of a specific statutory provision and the inapplicability of alternative responsibility-generating institutions such as leadership of an organized criminal group or accessorial liability, present the most prominent manifestations of the divergences between the two systems. The study concludes with a recommendation that the Iranian legislature formally recognize the doctrine of indirect perpetration as a distinct and general legal institution, thereby remedying the existing normative fragmentation and aligning Iranian criminal law more closely with contemporary developments in international criminal law.The doctrine of indirect perpetration, designated in Iranian legal doctrine as the <em>fā‘il-i ma‘navī</em> and in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court as the <em>indirect perpetrator</em> or the <em>mastermind of a crime</em>, remains one of the most significant yet theoretically contested forms of individual criminal responsibility. This article undertakes a comparative analysis of this criminal law institution within the Iranian legal system and the regime established under the Rome Statute of the ICC, employing a descriptive-analytical methodology to identify and examine the principal points of convergence and divergence between the two systems. The findings indicate that, on the one hand, the commission of a crime through the instrumentality of another, whether by means of innocent or guilty agency, the requirement of legal and practical authority over the physical perpetrator, conceptualized in the jurisprudence of the Court through the criterion of effective control over the crime, the necessity of a causal nexus between the conduct of the indirect perpetrator and the criminal result, and the requirement of the mental elements of intent and knowledge, constitute significant manifestations of the common aspects of the doctrine in the two legal orders. On the other hand, the acceptance of indirect perpetration as a general doctrine under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, in contrast to its fragmented and non-generalized recognition in Iranian criminal law; the requirement of a positive act by the indirect perpetrator under Iranian law, as opposed to the possibility of committing international crimes by omission within the jurisdiction of the Court; the adoption of a subjectivist approach and the imposition of equal punishment upon the indirect perpetrator and the physical perpetrator in the jurisprudence of the Court, in contrast to the mixed approaches to the criminal liability of the indirect perpetrator in the Iranian system, which alternate between subjectivist and objectivist orientations depending on the statutory context; and, finally, the unfeasibility of punishing the indirect perpetrator in Iranian law in the absence of a specific statutory provision and the inapplicability of alternative responsibility-generating institutions such as leadership of an organized criminal group or accessorial liability, present the most prominent manifestations of the divergences between the two systems. The study concludes with a recommendation that the Iranian legislature formally recognize the doctrine of indirect perpetration as a distinct and general legal institution, thereby remedying the existing normative fragmentation and aligning Iranian criminal law more closely with contemporary developments in international criminal law.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_3902_f9b8ab65573229cac499ed12ca122639.pdfUniverisity of QomComparative Studies on Islamic and Western Law2476-421313120260328A Legal Analysis of the Point in Time for Determining Property Exempt from Execution: A Comparative Perspective with Reference to the Common LawA Legal Analysis of the Point in Time for Determining Property Exempt from Execution: A Comparative Perspective with Reference to the Common Law291320352510.22091/csiw.2025.10802.2547FAAhadGholizadeh ManghutayAssociate Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Iran.0000-0003-4464-9410Journal Article20240528The point in time at which property exempt from execution (<em>mustathnayāt-i dayn</em>) falls to be determined is a matter that has been largely overlooked in legal scholarship, notwithstanding its critical importance for the coherent application of the Iranian Civil Judgment Enforcement Act, the Law on the Enforcement of Financial Judgments, and the bankruptcy provisions of the Commercial Code and the Law on the Administration of Bankruptcy Proceedings. This article undertakes a systematic legal analysis of this temporal criterion, designated as the moment of enforcement, and examines its doctrinal foundations, its practical implications, and its interaction with the related concepts of priority rights and insolvency. The study identifies the moment of issuance of the enforcement writ as the operative point in time for ordinary judgment debtors, and the moment of issuance of the bankruptcy judgment at first instance for bankrupts. It argues that the determination of this moment plays a decisive role in resolving a range of legal ambiguities, including the debtor's capacity to acquire or augment exempt property after the commencement of enforcement proceedings, the classification of exempt property into fixed and ongoing categories, and the legal consequences of deliberately incurring debt for the purpose of acquiring assets that would subsequently qualify as exempt from execution. The analysis further examines the inapplicability of this temporal criterion to legal persons and deceased natural persons, the manner in which the moment of enforcement governs the eligibility of dependants for exemption, and the complex interaction between the rules governing exempt property and the system of priority rights among creditors. Drawing upon a comparative perspective with reference to the common law, the article identifies both shared principles and notable divergences, including the absence in Iranian law of certain exemptions recognised in common law jurisdictions, such as life insurance policies and the wages of police and fire department officers, and the corresponding absence in the common law of certain Iranian exemptions, such as the cost of funeral clothing and a separate exemption for books and research tools. The study concludes that the systematic recognition and application of the moment of enforcement is indispensable for the coherent operation of the law of execution and for the fair balancing of the competing interests of judgment creditors and debtors.The point in time at which property exempt from execution (<em>mustathnayāt-i dayn</em>) falls to be determined is a matter that has been largely overlooked in legal scholarship, notwithstanding its critical importance for the coherent application of the Iranian Civil Judgment Enforcement Act, the Law on the Enforcement of Financial Judgments, and the bankruptcy provisions of the Commercial Code and the Law on the Administration of Bankruptcy Proceedings. This article undertakes a systematic legal analysis of this temporal criterion, designated as the moment of enforcement, and examines its doctrinal foundations, its practical implications, and its interaction with the related concepts of priority rights and insolvency. The study identifies the moment of issuance of the enforcement writ as the operative point in time for ordinary judgment debtors, and the moment of issuance of the bankruptcy judgment at first instance for bankrupts. It argues that the determination of this moment plays a decisive role in resolving a range of legal ambiguities, including the debtor's capacity to acquire or augment exempt property after the commencement of enforcement proceedings, the classification of exempt property into fixed and ongoing categories, and the legal consequences of deliberately incurring debt for the purpose of acquiring assets that would subsequently qualify as exempt from execution. The analysis further examines the inapplicability of this temporal criterion to legal persons and deceased natural persons, the manner in which the moment of enforcement governs the eligibility of dependants for exemption, and the complex interaction between the rules governing exempt property and the system of priority rights among creditors. Drawing upon a comparative perspective with reference to the common law, the article identifies both shared principles and notable divergences, including the absence in Iranian law of certain exemptions recognised in common law jurisdictions, such as life insurance policies and the wages of police and fire department officers, and the corresponding absence in the common law of certain Iranian exemptions, such as the cost of funeral clothing and a separate exemption for books and research tools. The study concludes that the systematic recognition and application of the moment of enforcement is indispensable for the coherent operation of the law of execution and for the fair balancing of the competing interests of judgment creditors and debtors.https://csiw.qom.ac.ir/article_3525_15f12319c2137416da077142b274b06d.pdf