The Principle of Speed in Civil Procedure and Its Sanction (Insights from the Imamiyyah jurisprudence European Convention of Human Rights)

Document Type : Academicm and Research

Authors

1 Phd candidate in jurisprudence and privet law, , faculty of law and political sciences ,kharazmi university tehran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Private Law, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran (

3 Associate Professor, Department of Private Law, Kharazmi University,Tehran, Iran

10.22091/csiw.2025.11132.2576

Abstract

Observing speed in civil proceedings is a crucial element of fair trial that simultaneously benefits individual and societal interests. Expedited litigation is also considered a fundamental human right, of such significance that many national regulations and international documents such as the European Convention on Human Rights refer to it as one of the principles of a fair trial. Judicial practices of the European Convention of Human Rights and Supreme Court indicate that failure to observe reasonable time limits comes with enforcement guarantees. However, despite the well-known position of this principle in international law, In domestic Iranian law, the legislator has not explicitly mentioned speed or the execution of justice within a reasonable time in any articles of the Civil Procedure Code, nor has it provided enforcement guarantees for its violation, although this concept underlies many regulations. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to examine the nature and position of speed in civil proceedings and to predict the guarantee of its implementation. The findings of this research show that it is difficult to accept speed in proceedings as a legal principle, but rather speed as one of the components of justice can only be one of the goals of the procedure and by predicting the guarantee of its implementation, it can guarantee its observance to some extent.

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